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On the Monetization of Deficits
ABSTRACT
Whether or not a deficit is
monetized is often thought to haveimportant
macroeconomic ramifications. Thispaper is organized around two questions.
The first is: Does
monetization matter?, or morespecifically, For a given
budget deficit, do nominalor real variables behave differently
depending
on whether deficits are monetized
or not? Virtually all macro modelsgive
an affirmative answer. After
sorting out some theoretical issues that
arise in a dynamic
context, i present some new time seriesevidence which
suggests that monetization matters
mostly for nominal variables.
The second question is: Whatfactors determine how muchmonetization
the Federal Reserve will do?
After discussing some normativerules, I
offer a game—theort
argument to explain why a central bankmay choose not
to monetize deficits at alland may even contract bankreserves when the
government raises its deficit. The
empirical work turns up asurprisingly
systematic link between budget deficitsand growth in reserves. This
relationship suggests that the FederalReserve monetizes deficits lesswhen






A government deficit is said to be 'moneti-ed" when the
central bank purchases the bonds that the government issues to
Because of the central bank's balance sheet
urchases increase bank reserves unless offset
tions. By contrast, new government debt
vate parties does not increase bank reserves.
difference, whether or not a deficit is
en thought to have important macro— economi
And there is considerable evidence that thi
orrect.
-
isorganized around two questions; Does
ter? and, What factors determine how much
Federal Reserve will do? Both of these
een asked before, and my answers will be less
My aims are more modest: to bring a bit more
evidence to bear on the issues and to add
I takes up the first question: For a givenbudget
deficit, will nominal or real variables behave differently
depending on whether the new bonds are purchased by the central
bank or by the public? Notice that this isbasically the same
as asking; Do open—market operations matter? Virtually all
macro models give an affirmative answer. But some recent
theoretical developments, which I review,suggest that the
issue is a good deal more complicated than indicatedby simple




















a few newthoughts toPAGE 2
some theoretical issues that arise in a dynamic context,I
present some new time series evidence which supportsthe old
idea that monetization matters.
Section II addresses the second issue: How does the Fed
decidehow much ofeach deficit to monetize?First, some
normative rules dictating how the Fed should make this decision
are presented and brie-fly evaluated. Then a gametheoretic
argument is offered to explain why a central bank with
discretionary authority may choose not to monetize deficits at
all and mayinstead do the opposite, i.e., contract bank
reserves when the government raises its deficit! Finally,I
offer some empirical evidence suggesting that there is a
systematic link between budget deficits and growth in reserves.
This relationship suggests that the Federal Reserve moneti:es
deficits less when inflation is high and when government
purchases are growing rapidly.PAGE 3
I. DOES MONETIZATION MATTER?
Elementary macro models, including both the quantity
theory and IS—LM, suggest that budget deficits have a greater
effect on aggregate demand if they are monetized.
This difference is extreme under the crude quantity
theory. Obviously, if Py=MV and V is a constant, then deficits
increase nominal demand if and only if they are monetized. <1>
A slightly more sophisticated quantity theory, which recognizes
that nonmonetized deficits raise velocity by raising interest
rates, allows for an effect of deficits on aggregate demand.
But the supposition that the effect of money is greater is
maintained.
Essentially the same conclusion emerges from the fix—
price IS—LM model. Figure 1 shows an initial IS—LM equilibrium
at point A. Higher government spending or a cut in taxes
raises the IS curve to IiSi.If the deficit is not monetized,
the LM curve is unchanged and equilibrium moves to point B;
output rises. But if the deficit is monetized, the LM curve
shifts as well (to L1M1) and output increases even more (point
C).
This is all very simple, but it leaves out much. Among
the important omissions are:
- (1)wealth effects on the IS and/or LM curves and the
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1. WEALTH EFFECTS AND THE GOVERNMENT BUDGET CONSTRAINT
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means a sure thing), then the long—run effects of a deficit onPAGE 5
aggregatedemand are greater ifitis not monetizeth
How can this be true in view of Figure 1? Suppose we add
wealth effects to the analysis and assume that government bonds
are net wealth. <2> Start with the case of bond financing
(point B). The additional wealth represented by the new bonds
augments consumer spending and pushes the IS curve further to
the right. At the same time. however, the LM curve shifts
leftward if there is a wealth effect on the demand for money
<3> The net result of these two wealth effects is clearly to
increase r. But the net effect on V seems to be ambiguous.
However, Solow and I showed (as is obvious) that in a stable
system the net impact of the two wealth effects must increase
income.
Thedynamic adjustment proceeds as follows. Each
injectionof bonds increases income, and the process continues
(in a stable system) until the induced tax receipts bring the
budget into balance. The dynamics are similar under money
financing, except that each dollar of newly— created money has
an additional liquidity effect on the LM curve which malr:es Y
rise even faster.
Why, then, do bond—financed deficits have larger effects
in the long run? The reason, loosely speaking, is that bond—
financeddeficits "last longer." More precisely, bond—
financeddeficits raise the government's interest expenses
whereas money— financed deficits reduce them. Thus, while each
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2. CAPITAL CCUf1ULTION IND THE LONG RUN
The original paper by Solow and myself allowed -Forcapital
accumulation and showed that, apart from modifications in the
stability conditions, this wrinkle did not affect the basic
results. However, the model we used maintained the
(inappropriate) assumption of a fixed price level.
of high—powered money, the total amount
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I take up next.PAGE 7
Fortunately, subsequent work established very similar
conclusions in models which deal more satisfactorily with the
price level. <4>
-
Ifthe labor force and technology are more or less
exogenous, then the long—run effects of monetization depend on
how the capital stock reacts. Neoclassical growth models lead
to the supposition that money financing of deficits is better
for capital formation than bond financing, <5> but adding even
a minimal amount of complexity to standard macro models
introduces enough ambiguity so that even this intuitive
conclusion cannot be derived.
The ambiguities arise from the interaction of wealth
effects and interest elasticities, neither one of which can be
ignored without assuming away the problem. Consider, as an
example, the following simple IS—LM model augmented to include
wealth effects:
(4) y =c(y—t(y).a) +i(r—ir,K)+g
(5) M/P =L(r,y, a)
(6) a =K+M/P+B/P
- (7)dtl/dt +dB/dt=P(g—t(y))+rB
(8) (1/P)(dP/dt) u +h(y—F(K))
(9) dK/dt =i(r—n,K)
Equations (4) and (5) are IS and LM curves augmented to include
-real wealth, a, which is defined in (6). Here r denotes the
nominal interest rate and iTtheexpected rate of inflation.
The difference between M and H is ignored. Equations (7)—(9)PAGE 8
give the dynamics of the three state variables: P. K, and
either M or B. Equation (7) is the government budget
constraint; equation (8) is an expectational Phillips curve;
and equation (9) updates the capital stock.
The signs of most of the short— run comparative static
multipliers implicit in (4)—(6) can be determined with only the
usual qualitative assumptions. An important exception.
however, is dr/dM which., even ignoring possible effects of M on
expected inflation (about which more later), has the sign of:
CaLy -(1_L.a)[1_c(1._tI')]
anexpression which is negative in the absence of wealth
effects, but ambiguous in their presence. The economics behind
this ambiguity is quite simple. Normally, an increase in II
lowers interest rates by shifting the LM curve to the right.
But the wealth effects of an injection of money shift the UI
curve to the left and the IS curve to the right, thereby
pushing up interest rates. These wealth effects could
conceivably be strong enough to offset the original effect of .M
on the LM curve.
-Asmight be surmised, this ambiguity is devastating to
long—run analysis where primary attention focuses on the
behavior of the capital stock. If we do not know in which
direction II pushes r, then we certainly will not be able to
• tell in which direction it pushes K,In fact, none of the
long—run comparative static derivatives (obtained from
equations (4>—() and from equations (7)—(9) set equal to zero)PAGE 9
are of determinate sign unless wealth effects are assumed away.
But this is not a legitimate way out of the indeterminacy
because Solow and I (1973) showed years ago that wealth effects
are intimately involved in the stability conditions. <6>
The conclusion, unfortunately, seems to be that theory
will tell us little about the long—run consequences of the
monetization decision. Econometric estimation arid simulation
of quantitative models seem to be the only ways out.
3. THE GOVERNMENT BUDGET CONSTRAINT AND EXPECTATIONS
The dynamic constraints across choices of policy mixes set
up by the government budget constraint bring expectaticDnal
issues to the fore.. The identity points out that today's
deficit and monetization decisions have implications for the
feasible set of fiscal—monetary combinations in future periods.
For example, suppose an expansionary -Fiscal policy today
leads to a large deficit that is not monetized. Future
government budgets will therefore inherit a larger burden of
interest payments, so the same time paths of 6, M, and tax
rates will lead to larger deficits. What will the government
do about this? That depends on its reaction function. For
example, large deficits and high interest rates might induce
greater monetary expansion in the future (the possibility
emphasized by Sargent and Wallace (1961)).Alternatively, it
might induce future tax increases (the case stressed by BarroPAGE 10
(1974)), or cuts in government spending (the apparent hope of
Reaganomics).Yet another possibility is that the government
will simply finance the burgeoning deficits by issuing more and
more bonds. <7>
All of these are live options, and have different
implications for the long—run evolution of the economy. In
fact, under rational expectations, they may have different
implications for the state of the economy today.
As an example of a nor-imonetized deficit, considera tax
cut financed by issuing new bonds. Such a tax cut today
enlarges currentandprospective future budget deficits,
thereby requiring some combination of the following policy
adjustments:
(1) increases in future taxes;
(2) decreases in futuregovernment expenditures;
(3)increases in futuremoney creation;
(4)increases infuture issues of interest— bearing
nationaldebt.
To the extent that the current decisions made by individuals
andfirms areinfluenced by their expectations about the
fUture,each of these alternatives may have different
implications for the effects o-f the tax cut today.
For example, if people believe that a tax cut financed by
bonds simply reduces today's taxes and raises future taxesin
orderto pay the interest on the bonds, then consumptionmay
notbe affected. This is essentially Darro's (1974) argument.PAGE 11
Alternatively, people may believe that the policy will
eventually lead to greater money creation.Ifsothe
inflationary expectations thereby engendered may affect their
current decisions in ways that are not captured by standard
behavioral functions. This is essentially the point made by
Sargent and Wallace (1981) in arguing that tight money may be
inflationary.
Still different reactions would be expected if people
thought the current deficit would lead to lower government
spending or to more bond issues in the future. The theoretical
possibilities are numerous, limited only by the imagination of
the theorist. <8>
Rational expectations interact with the government budget
constraint in an obvious way. Feople's beliefs about the
future consequences of current monetary and fiscal decisions
ar-b conditioned by their views of the policy rules that the
authorities will follow. To the extent that these beliefs
affect their current behavior, different perceived policy rules
actually imply different short—run policy multipliers under
rational expectations.
This is easily illustrated in the context o-f the preceding
IS—UI model. Consider the short—run multiplier dy/dg allowing
for a possible effect of g on inflationary expectations via the
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and from the chain rule that:
dy/dg = + Cdvr/dg) C
3g h
¶ g
Thefirst term is the standard (positive) governmentspending
multiplier in IS—LM analysis. The second term is the product
of a positive effect of inflationary expectationson output and
an effect of g on iwhichdepends on the factors enumerated
above.If it is positive, as seems likely, thenexpectational
effects make the short—run multiplier larger. But it is
conceivable that dir/dg could be zero or even negative.
A key question for policy formulation is: howimportant
are these expectational effects in practice? This seems to
depend principally on how forward—looking urrent economic
decisions really are.
Take the tax cut example again. Under thepure permanent
income hypothesis (PIH) only the present discounted valueof
lifetime alter—tax income flows affects currentconsumption.
<9>So expectations about future budget policy should have
iniportant effects on currentconsumption. But if short-
sightedness, extremely high discount rates, or capital market
imperfections effectively break many of the links between the
future and the present, then currentconsumption may be rather
insensitive to these expectations and rather sensitiveto
current income. Even under fully rational expectations and thePAGE 13
pure PIH, consumption may depend largely on current income if
the stochastic process generating income is highly serially
correlated. These are issues about which knowledge is
accumulating; but much remains to be learned. The evidence to
date does not lead to the conclusion that long—term
expectations rule the roost. <10>
The other two places where expectations about future
fiscal and monetary policies might have significant effects on
current behavior are wage and price setting and investment.
Investment, of course, is the quintessential example of an
economic decision which is strongly conditioned by expectations
about the future.. Even Keynes knew this! Eut, once again,
there are some real—world considerations that interfere with
the strictly neoclassical view of investment as the
unconstrained solution to an intertemporal optimization
problem. One is that capital rationing may interfere with a
firm's ability to run current losses on the expectation of
future profits. A second is that management may use ad hoc
rules such as the payback period criterion in appraising
investment projects. A third is the emerging "business school'
view that managers are more shortsighted than they "should be"
because they face the wrong incentives. A fourth is that there
may be a strong accelerator element in investment spending,
which ties the current investment decision much more tightly to
the current state of the economy than neoclassical economics
recognizes. As in the consumption example, each of theserules which are based
as expected future exc
crucial. Aain, this
before we can make any
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things diminishes the Importance of the future to
decision making and thereby renders expectational
important.
Wage and price setting is another
hoc rules which adjust wages or prices in accor
law of supply and demand," or which are mainly













whether or not to plan a picnic on a given
your
Similarly, the importance of expectations for macroeconomic
aggregates is diminished by the likelihood that different
people hold different expectations about what future government
policies are likely to be. <12> If some people believe today's
tax cuts signal higher future taxes, some believe they signalPAGE 15
higher future money creation, and some believe they signal
lower future government spending, then expectations about the
future may have meager current effects in the aggregate.
The conclusion seems to be that, while we should not
forget about expectational effects operating through the
government budget constraint, neither should we get carried
away by them. There is no reason to believe that they are the
whole show.
4. NEW TIME SERIES EVIDENCE
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Granger (1969) and Sims (1972
Two points are worth making,
Granger—causation has nothing(13) ,Y/Y =a(L)(AV/Y)+
Thesewere estimated on anni.tal fi
maximum lag extending back either
Monetization "does not matter
Predict growth in Y, iftheb coef
Analogously, debt
(AR/R> +c(L)(tD/D).
year data, with the
or three years. <13>
that is, fails to help
ientsare Jointly
icy "does not matter"
causation in theusualsense.Since it is quite possible,
especially once expectational influences are accounted for.
that the "effect" might precede the "cause," learning that X
Granger—causes V tells us nothing about whether or not V moved
"because of" X.It means that X adds to the ability to
predict Y, no more and no less.
(2) Whether or not X contributes to the ability to
predict Y may depend on what other information is considered.
Thus, for example, it is perfectly possible that X might
Granger— cause V when some other variable, Z, is excluded from
the regression, but fail to Granger—cause V when Z is
included.In this context, I will interpret the question
"Does monetization matter?" as asking whether or notchanges
in bank reserves Granger—cause nominal GNF growth (or
inflation) once we control for growth of the national debt.
Letting V denote nominal GNP. R denote bank reserves, D
denote the outstanding stock o-f government bonds(including
the portion owned by the Fed), and denote the first—








(given monetary policy) if the c coefficients are Jointly
insignificant. Notice that the crude quantity theory suggests
a unitary long—run elasticity for bank reserves and a zero
long—run elasticity for the non—monetized debt, that is:
Sc=0 Sa +Sb=1and
These hypotheses are all testable by standard F tests.
In estimating (13), D was defined as the increase in
government indebtedness to the public during fiscal year t.
Fiscal, rather than calendar, years were used so as to get a
more accurate measure of the deficit. Budget numbers in the
national income and product accounts (NIPA) differ in several
ways from those in the unified budget, and the deficit series
I used differs further from the unified budget owing to the
activities of off—budget agencies. This suggests a
potentially large slippage between, say, quarterly NIPA
deficit numbers and the true government borrowing
requirement.
In order to use the fiscal year as the unit of time,
quarterly data on adjusted bank reserves, P, <14> and nominal
GNP. V, were put on a fiscal year basis. <15> Results from
estimating equation (13) by ordinary least squares over the
period 1952—1981 appear as regressions (1) and (2) in Table 1.
Roughly speaking, the regressions make it look as if only the
first lag of each variable matters. But, in keeping with the
spirit of this sort of work, the "insignificant" variables
were not dropped.Table 1







































5)Za +Eb=1 l2.lL** 12.Ol**
6) Za +Eb=1and 12.0l** l3.l6
Zc=0
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.
*denotes significant at 5% level.
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Deficits certainly seem to1 conclusion from these regressions is clear:
and nonmonetized deficits are significant
of ubseqLtent C'NP growth.
vious question is whether the debt and reserves
L(sed in Table 1 are mainly predicting movements of
movements of real output.Toaddress this question,
eports the results from regressions analogous to
(13), but using the GNP deflator in place of nominal
The results differ from those obt
in a number of ways, and are far more
quantity—theoretic approach. Unfortu
the case of nominal GF'IP, some of the
we use the regression with three lags
regression with two lags (column 2).
First, the null hypothesis that growth
Contribute to the explanation of inflation
the equation using three lags ——butonly
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.tiMtter.
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1
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6) Ea +Eb=1 3.25 1.08
andEc=0
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.
*denotes significant at 5% level.significance,notatthe17.level.Intheequation usingtwo
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growth in reserves 1
17., level.(Ftestnumber 3.) However, the null hypOthesis
that the long—run elasticity of P with respect to D is zero
cannot be rejected.(F test number 4.) The implications that
we associate with the strict quantity theory (see F tests 5
and 6) also cannot be rejected.
Table 3 reports the analogous regressions and F tests
using real GNP in place of nominal GNP. Naturally, the
explanatorypower is much lower since we areusingnominal
reservesand nominal debt to explain a real variable.In
general, very fewsignificant effects are found.
For e<ample, thehypothesisthat growth in reserves does
not help predict real GNP growth can be rejected at the 57.
level in the regression using two lags of each variable. But
it cannot be rejected at the 17. level; and it cannot beTable 3
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1) All b. =0 2.56 11.01*
1
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Notes:Standard errors in parentheses.
*denotes significant at 5% level.The hypothesis that growth in
real GNP growth cannot be rejected
While the point estimates of
with respect to R are sizeable and
the two versions). neither differs
quantity—theoretic value of zero
estimated long—run elasticity of y
small positive number (.06 and .13
is nowhere near significant (see F
In sum, neither growth
national debt carries much
predicting future real GNF
debt does not help predict
in either regression
the long—run elastici
negative (—.46 and —
significantly-from t
see F text number 2).
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test number 4).
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rejected at all in the regression using three lags of each
















equations..The -factthat bothvariables were significant
predictorso-f futuregrowthinnominalGNF seemstostem
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II.THE DETERMINANTS OF MONETIZATION
The government budget constraint. by pointing out that
there are two ways to finance a deficit, creates a presumption
that a blend of the two will normally be used; that is. it
creates a presumption that some fraction of the deficit will
monetized.. Let denote the nominal deficit in fiscal year
and write (1) as:
•
- (14)dH/dt




Thisis nothing but an identity; it carries no behavioral
implications ——noteven that typically positive.. Our
interest is in the factors determining B.
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with m approximately equal tQ the reciprocal of the requiredPAGE 23
1SOME SUGGESTED MONETIZ½TION RULES
Before estimating (17) let us consi
that have been suggested for the monetiz
MONETARISM
The most famousandmost widely—discussed suggestion
monetary rule can be attributed, more or less accurately,
Milton Friedman. Under Friedman's suggested regime, the
would keep the money supply growing at some constant rate
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The mechanism behind these results is not hard to
understand. Suppose some shock (such as an autonomous decline
iii demand in a Keynesian model) opens up a deficit in the
government budget, and the monetarist regime is in force.
Bonds will be issued to finance the deficit. With both
interest rates and the number of bonds increasing, interest
payments on the national debt will be increasing. Butthis
increases the deficit still further, requiring even larger
issues of bonds in subsequent periods, and the process repeats.
if thereal rate o-F interestexceeds the rate of population
growth, then the real supplyofbondsper capita will grow
withoutlimitConsequently, unless bonds are totally
irrelevant to other economic variables (as in the non—
Ricardian view of Barro (1974)). the whole economy will
explode. <17>
So the stabilizing properties of the monetarist rule are
open to serious question, to say the least. What about its
longer—run effects?
As a long—run defense against inflation, the monetarist
rule seems to be very effective. Although academic scribblers
can, and have, constructed examples of continuous in-flaton
without growth in reserves, my feeling is that policy makers
can justifiably treat these models as intellectual curiosa and
proceed on the assumption that a maintained growth rate of
reserves will eventually control the rate of inflation.
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hence probably leads to a stable system. On this
it has much to recommend it over monetarism.
But there is more to the story. Consider what
happen when, for example, a deficiency of aggregate
brought on a recession. Falling incomes would open
deficit, and this would aL(tomatically induce the Fed
the monetary spigot. The economy would get
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How does it score on the more long—run
that recessions wouldautomaticallyengender






al worry is over infi





<20> If thePAGE 28
rule is believed, even large injections of money should not
raise the spectre of secular inflation.
While I have never been an advocate of rigid rules,, it
seems to me that all this adds up to a clear conclusion: the
old Friedman rule ought to get more serious quantitative
attention and the new Friedman rule ought to get less.
2. GAME THEORY AND MONETIZATION
We have seen that it has been suggested that the optimal
marginal monetization rate is zero and that the optimal
marginal monetization rate is one. These suggestions would
seem to bracket the relevant alternatives. ut such is not
necessarily the case once we remember that stabilization policy
in the United States is in the hands of two independent
authorities, one in charge of fiscal policy and the other in
charge of monetary policy, with neither one dominating the
other. <21>
When the two policy makers are at loggerheads, a policy
mix of tight money and loose fiscal policy frequently results,
with deleterious effects on interest rates and investment. <22>
What outcome does theory lead us to expect when fiscal and
monetary policy are in different hands and the two parties have
different ideas about what is best for the economy?
A natural way to conceptualize this situation is as a
twb—person non—zero—sum game. And a natural candidate for what
will emerge, it seems to me, is the Nash equilibrium. Why thePAGE 29
Nash equilibrium? Both policy makers understand that they do
not operate in a vacuum. Each—presumably understands that he
is facing an intelligent adversary with a decision making
problem qualitatively- similar to-his own. Furthermore, this is
a repeatedgame; each policymaker has been here before and
assumesthathe will be here again.It seems natural that each
would assume that the other will make the optimal response to
whatever strategy he plays.If so, each will probably play his
Nash strategy.
-.
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tight money and a loose budget.
This explains the entries in the payoff matrix (Figure 2).
Now where is the Nash equilibrium? The example is a case of
the Prisoners' Dilemma since each player has a dominant
strategy. Specifically, if the Fed raises bank reserves, the
administration will plan for a higher deficit and the Fed will
wind upwithits least— preferred outcome (the lower righthand
box). So the Fed will reduce bank reserves, Knowing this, the
administration's best strategy is to raise the deficit, so the
outcOme will be the lower lefthand box. Clearly, this is the
only Nash equilibrium for this game. It also seems to be the
most plausible outcome of uncoordinated but intelligent
behavior.
But notice two interesting aspects of this outcome.
First, the deficit goes up and bank reserves go down; looked
at from the perspective of equation (17), the marginal
monetization rate is negative
Second, both the Fed and the fiscal authority agree that
the upper riqhthand box ——easymoney plus tight fiscal policy
——issuperior to the Nash equilibrium. Under full monetary—
fiscal coordination, they might well select this policy mix.
But, if they cannot reach an agreement, then the Nash
equilibrium ——aPareto— inferior outcome ——islikely to
ar i se.
Ifthisexample is typical, then switching from a system
of two uncoordinated policy makers to one with a single,The problem
coordination is
authorities have
not be easily ir
illustrates that
impossible in an








is no reason to
sum games to be
• of course, is that
more easily said than
reasons for disagreei
oned out. <23> However
full coordination (wh
y event> may not




tical. What we need in
to consultwithone
oth parties view as
ON MONETIZATION
of the Fed's "reaction function" began







maker might yield substantial gains.




















this is not too
ings become far





less clear if one policy maker
references or the economic model
no particLilar reason to think the
and other solutions become















of the other. There
3. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
Econometric study
some years ago and has
recentyears,severalauthorshave investigated whether or




The first papers to focus on
Barro (1978) and Niskanen (1978>,
conclusion: that the size of the
little to do with money growth.
Barro studied the period 1941—1976,
had developed elsewhere to divide money
and unanticipated components. He found
deficit (NIFA basis), when added to his
(which included a federal expenditure v
"wrong" sign. suggesting that deficits
growth. However, when the expenditure
the coefficient of the deficit was corr
of the literature that followed, it is












The evidence obtained so far is
the monetization issue, by
reached more or less the same
federal deficit has rather
regressions changed dramatically when the war years(1941—1945)
were excluded from the sample.
-Niskanen'sspecification looked more like a traditional
reaction function. Using annual data covering 1948— 1976,he
sought to explain money growth by the lagged growthrates of
real GNP and prices (reflecting stabilization objectives)and
the federal deficit. His regression fit the data rather poorly
but, unlike Barra's, yielded a correctly signedand
statistically significant coeflicient on the deficit. However,PAGE 33
Niskanen found that the coefficient of the deficit becamesmall
and insignificant when he included a dummy variable for the
years 1967—1976.
Hamburger and Zwick (1981) changed Barro's money growthand
government spending variables to make them more comparableto
his measure of the deficit and also to align them better in
time; they also shortened the period to 194—1976.Consistent
with Barro, they obtained a coefficient of 1..C)9 (with a t—ratio
of 2.2) on spending and a coefficient of —0.26 (with a t—ratio
of 0.6)onthe deficit. However, when they further shortened
the period to 1961—1976 (leaving Just 16 observations) the
results changed dramatically. The coefficient of the spending
variable fell to 0.18 (and became insignificant) while the
coefficient of the deficit rose to 0.92 (with a t—ratia of
1.9).
These results appear to tell us as much about the extreme
sensitivity of the estimates to the choice of sample period as
they do about whether or not the Fed monetizes deficits.
However, in a very recent paper Hamburger and Zwick(1982)
extend their results through 1981 with very little change in
the estimates.
These studies lead to no firm conclusions about the
determinants of monetization. <2> However, they do create a
skeptical attitude about facile assertions that deficitsinduce
faster money growth. More importantly, the studies teach us
some valuable lessons about the formulation c-F. an appropratePAI3E 34
research strategy. Specifically:
(1) Results are extremely sensitive to the choice of time
period, suggesting that the Fed's behavior pattern may have
changed over time. This led me to do considerable testing of
the estimated relationships for temporal stability.
(2> Results are also rather sensitive to the particular
time series that are used, suggesting a relationship that is
far from robust. This led me to pay careful attention to the
measurement of certain variables ——especially"money" and "the
deficit" ——andtheir alignment in time. <26>
A FIRST LOOK AT THE DATA
My point of departure is equation (17), which can be
thought of as a modified version of the government budget
constraint. Until we specify the nature of more fully, all
this equation does is remind US that (a) "monetization" means
creation of high—powered money, not of any of the standard M's,
and (b) currency changes ought to be controlled for in
analyzing the determinants of changes in bank reserves.
Figure 3 plots the change in adjusted bank reserves
against the increase in the outstanding stock of government
interest—bearing debt. As in the regressions in Section L4,
thefiscal year is the unit for measuring time. The scatter
diagram covers fiscal years 1949 through 1981.
Though the measure of "money" is quite different from that
used in earlier studies, <27> we see immediately that more













































































































































































































between deficits and growth in reserves. The eyeball, with its
inability to do multiple regression analysis, is unable to
discérn any such relationship.
_______Regression(1) in Tabletakes the next step.It
controls for changes in currency as suggested by equation (17),
but maintains the null hypo.thesis that is constant through
time. <28> Once again, there is no apparent relationship
between the deficit and growth in reserves; the adjusted
•-theregression, for example, is —.01! Note, however, that the
coefficient of changes in currency, while insignificant, turns
out more or less as expected (perhaps a bit too high>.
Breaking the sample into smaller subperiods as suggested
by the previous literature, does not improve the relationship
between deficits and growth in reserves. The data show no
obvious correlation between the two variables.
—---—RE6RESSION ANALYSIS
Uf course, a lack of zero—order correlation does not
necessarily imply that there i.s no relationship once other
pertinent influences are controlled for. Among the variables
that might be expected to influence ,thefraction c-f the
deficit that is monetized, are
(a) the size of the deficit (if there is a nonlinear
relationship>;
(b) the lagged dependent variable (if there is inertia
in the Fed's behavior); <29>
Cc) interest rates (iftheFed wants to limit theTable 4
Determinants of Mbnetizationa
(1) (2) (3) (4) (.5) (6)
./-Time Period..19.49SI :l9k98]V..I9496O 196181•i9688i :1954—81
Coefficient (s.e. of:
Constant .0014 .0010 .0005 .0013 .0006 .0006
(.0003) (.0003) (.0005) (.0003) (.00O8) (.0002)
6 /Y :013 .076 .151 .064 .070 .039
t (015) (.023) (.061). (.019)(.022) (.019)
•—5Ol5
.733 .-.833 •—.550
(.303) (2.262) (.194)(.226) (.228)
—.455 —.645 —.398 —.367—.230
(.161) (.297) (.137)(.154) (.171)
—.140 —.061 .093 —.099 .110 .153
(.118) (.107) (307) (.108)(.222) (:089)
.05 .36 .58 .56 .67 .27
DW 1.78 1.78 2.94 2.16 2.53 2.60
aDependent variablechange in adjusted bank reserves, divided
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is
the sample into two
This break point was
Regression (2) In Tablegives the result for the whole
period. According to this regression, 7.67. of any deficit
would be monetized if there were no inflation last year and
real purchases were unchanged. Both inflation and growth of
purchases tend to decrease the fraction of the deficit that
monetized. The coefficient of currency is reasonable. The
explanatory power of the equation(R2..36) is moderate, at
best. <30>
Regressions (3) and (4) break
subperiods, 1949—1960 and 1961—1981.
prompted both by the Hamburger—Zwick results and by the
observation that several of the residuals for years prior to
1960 were quite large. Although Levy placed the break in his
regression after 1969, a series of regressions confirmed that
the 1960/1961 break created a local minimum in the combined sum
of squared residuals of the two equations.
Substantial differences emerge between the two equations.
The effect of inflation on the rate of monetization is only
about one—seventh as large in the later period, suggesting a
greater tolerance of inflation. The coefficient of currency is
reasonable in the later period, but unreasonable in the earlier
period. The Durbin—Watson statistic is also far better in the
later period.In general, the equation performs much better in
1961—1981 than
It is tempting to conclude that a stable relationship has
it does in 1949—1960.PAGE 38
existed since 1961, but not before, which would help explain
some of the earlier results. To test this notion further, the
time period for the 1961—1981 regression was changed by
alternatively adding or subtracting a year from the start of
the sample.I found a remarkably stable relationship as the
period was shortened to begin later than 1961. For example,
the regression over 1968—1981 (which has only 14 observations)
is reported as regression (5) in Table t.Exceptfor the
currency coefficient, it looks amazingly similar to regression
(4). There was considerably less stability as the sample was
lengthened by beginning earlier than 1961, however. As an
illustration, regression (6) reports the results for the
1954—1981 period.
Two further tests for equation stability were performed.
First, the equation for 1961—1981 was differenced, a procedure
suggested by Plosser and Schwert (1978) as a test for
specification error. The estimates changed little, which
provides further support for the specification.(Changes were
greater for the 1949—1960 regression, where we are a bit short
on degrees of freedom.) Second, a Chow test was performed to
look for evidence of a structural shift starting in 1973,
the period of floating exchange rates. The F statistic for
this test was nearly zero.
The implied marginal monetization rates for the two
periods, based on regressions (3) and (4) in Table L1,areas
follows:For 1949—1960:
For 1961—1981:
The major difference i
inflation rates near 2
1949—1960 period, the
close (around 47.oft
the more recent rule






combination of the i
monetization of defi










h in real purchases









0 than to the b
as suggested by






































































ts are mainly inflationary
ized, then budget deficits
inflationary fears.
OTHER RESULTS
The measure of the Federal
work violates elementary princi
because it fails to net out the
the outstanding debt caused by i
used in the empirical
nflation accounting
in the real value of
Putting the samePAGE 40
point somewhat differently, it fails to include the implicit
receipts from the inflation tax. Should the deficit be
corrected for inflation?
If we want to model the Fed as a rational government
bureau free of inflation illusion, then it is hard to argue
against making the correction. True, it is the entire
(uncorrected) deficit that must be financed by selling bonds.
But some of these "new" bonds merely replace existing bonds
whose real values are eroded b' inflation. Since we do not
count rollover as part of the government's borrowing
requirement., neither should we count the portion of the
putative deficit that merely maintains the real value of the
existing debt.
On the other hand, casual empiricism suggests that it is
only a minority of economists and accountants who are free o-f
this particular form of inflation illusion. If we are
interested in describing how the Fed actually behaved, rather
than how it should have behaved, then perhaps the uncorrected
deficit is the appropriate variable to use.
In fact, when I ran regressions like those in Table
using the inflation— corrected deficit, the fits of the
regressions deterioriated enormously. The adjusted R2 for the
new version of regression (2) actually became negative! In
other words, whatever success we have in explaining
monetization of the uncorrected deficit completely disappears
when we seek to explain monetization of the corrected deficitsPAGE 41
This leaves two possibilities. Either we have a passablemodel
of the monetization decision of a Federal Reserve whichsuffers
from inflation illusion, or the Fed is free of inflation
illusion but its behavior is unpredictable.I am personally
inclined toward the former view, but the data admit of both
interpretations.
A second issue is raided by Barro's non—Ricardian
equivalence theorem.I have tacitly accepted the view that
taxes are something quite distinct from debt by taking debtand
money as alternative ways of financing the excessof
expenditures over tax receipts. But, if debt and taxes are
equivalent,.then the true decision is among current taxes,
future taxes (i.e., debt), and money as alternative ways of
financing government expenditures. On this view, expenditures,
not the deficit, should be the independent variable in a
regression explaining money creation.
To study this issue, I disaggregated the deficit into
three additive components ——outlays,tax receipts, and net
off—budget borrowing ——andre—ran the regressions in order to
test the following two constraints:
-U)that outlays and the off—budget deficit have the same
coefficient;
(ii) that the coefficient of tax receipts is equal and
opposite to that of outlays.
Both constraints are imposed by the regressions in Table i,and
the results strongly supported them. Not only did an F testPAGE 44
III.SUMMARY
- Simple-"old—fashioned K:eynesian" macro models suggest that
budget deficits always expand aggregate demand., but that their
effects are stronger iftheyare monetized; that is., monetary
policy matters.
The time series evidence on nominal GNF' growth offered
here, though incapable of giving structural information, is
consistent with these ideas.In-Formation on changes in bank
reserves helps predict nominal I3NP changes, even when changes
in government debt are controlled for. Symmetrically, changes
in outstanding debt are a significant predictor of nominal GNF
changes even after controlling for changes in reserves.
If we focus on inflation rather than nominal BNP growth,
however, more surprising results are obtained. Growth in
government debt is a significant predictor of inflation, even
after growth in bank reserves are controlled -For.But,
surprisingly enough, the evidence that bank reserves
contributes anything to the prediction of inflation that is not
already supplied by debt is decidedly mixed.
The received theory gives us far less guidance on long—
run issues. Some ambiguities arise from interest elasticities
and wealth effects; others arise from complexities stemming
from the reaction of expectations. A believable empirical
model for addressing these issues is sorely needed, but has yetPAGE .43
hihëfr inflation or increased growth of realfederal purchases
by slowing the expansion of reserves. Then our regression,by
rorcingp?nd x.to enter interactivelywith might make the
deficit appear to be a significant factor in the Fed's behavior
When, in fact, it was not.
To examine this possibility, I re—ran regressions (2),
(3), and (4) in Table 3 replacing the interactionvariables x6
and p6 by x and p alone. For the period
locus, this substitution caused the fit of the regressionto
deteriorate enormously; F? fell to .10 and all the righthand
variables were insignificant. For the 1949—1981 period as a
whole, the deteriorated only slightly, but the Durbin—Watson
statistic fell to 1.18, giving strong evidence of
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fail (by a large margin) to reject them, but the point
estimates conformed reasonably well to the constraints. By
contrast, the non—Ricardian equivalence hypothesis would seem
to call for a coefficient of zero on taxes, a restriction that
was easily rejected.
As indicated earlier, other plausible ri
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growth as the dependent variable.(See footnote
There is still one further possibility. Perhaps the Fed
really ignored deficits, but systematically reacted to eitherPAGE 45
to be developed.If the coefficients of the time series
regressions are interpreted as reduced form multipliers, they
imply that both monetized and nonmonetized deficits have
sizable, though not always statistically significant, long—run
effects on nominal GNP and prices. But this "evidence" is no
more than suggestive, if that, given the non— structural
approach that has been followed.I regard the question as
open.
While the Fed has not followed any rigid monetization
rule, its postwar behavior comes far closer to the "new
Friedman" monetarist rule (no monetization at the margin> than
it does to the "old Friedman" bondist rule (complete
monetization at the margin>. But when inflation has been high,
the Fed typically has reduced bank reserves despite government
deficits; that is, monetization has been negative ——an
.
outcome"predicted" by the game—theoretic analysis of monetary
and fiscal policy presented here.
In general, the empirical relationship between budget
deficits and the creation or destruction of bank reserves seems
far more stable and systematic than previous research would
lead us to believe. However, the relationship appears to date
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in deciding what fracti
like to close, however, by posing
Exactly why does the monetization
The question is both deep and vexing.
that easy (tight> money creates a surplus
medium of exchange which, in turn, spurs (
activity ——strainsthe credulity of many
creation does seem to have real effects in
One possibility, raised first by Tobi
by King and Plosser (1982), is that money
passively to real activity. On this view.
role; real activity simply pulls money al
statistical correlation with no causal mt
some sympathy with this view.. However
virtually all businessmen, seem to thi
periods in which tight money led to a
activity.
A second possibility, which Joseph
are developing in a thcoming paper, is that creation of new
bank reserves leads an expansion of credit which loosens
quantitative constrats that were previously binding. On this
view, the statisticacorrelation between money and real
economic activity isno accident, but it merely reflects their
mutual connection tothe same important phenomenon ——theebb
and flow of credit.PAGE 47
Neither of these views has yet been fully worked out and
subjected to empirical testing.It may be that neither will
prove correct. But little progress can be madein resolving
the theoretical issues pertaining to monetization until we have
a more convincing story of why monetary policy has real effects
in the first place.PAGE 1
FOOTNOTES
1. The only possible slippage is between expansion of bank
reserves (which is the direct consequence of monetization) and
expansion of the money stock.In practice, the money
multiplier is stable enough so that this is not a major worry.
2.Asis well—known, Barro (1974) has argued against this
assumption. For a critique o-f Barro's argument, see Buiter and
Tobin (1979). For an analysis of the dynamics ofthe
government budgetconstraintunder the assumption that Barro
was right, see McCallum (1982)..
3. The existence of a wealth effect on the demand for money,
though often assumed (see, for example, Tobin (1982)), is by no
means gL(aranteed.It could be absent, for example, under a
strict transactionist point of view.
4.See, among others. Tobin and Buiter (1976), Pyle and
Turnovsky (1976), and Turnovsky (1979).
5. See, for example, Diamond (1965) or Phelps and Shell (1969).
The latter shows that it is just a suggestion, not a cleandeduction.
PAGE 2
6. IfPis somehow fixed, as it was in the original
1inder—Solow article, then these difficulties do not arise.
Butsuch a model makeslittle sensefor long—run analysis.
stability of the economy under this
into question. More on this later.

















for example. Blinder (1981), Hall and Mishkin (1982),
(1982), or Mankiw (1981). Bernanke (1981) is more
ic aboutthe PIH.
12. Divergent expectations have been emphasized recently by,
7. The
called




11. For an interesting discussion o-f
backward—lookingwage contracts, and
between them empirically, see Taylor
forward—looking versus
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transition quarter was omitted. In aggregating
y data into fiscal years, I used seasonallyadjusted
due to their presumed greater accuracy than the
y unadjusted data.
16. Insulating the rate of interest from currency shifts
amounts to the same thing. It is the schedule relating money
supply to r that is presumed to be insulated by the Fed.
in the Granger—Sims methodology,which is 13. Nothing
atheoretic, tells us in what form to enter
form of equation (13) is suggestive of a t
which asset stocks influence income flows,
theory. By contrast, in Keynesian models
depends on the stock of reserves, but on t
to the national debt (i.e., on the deficit
to experiment with a reformulation of equa
replaced AD. However, this alternative





17. In a complex system, many more things are going on than I
can describe in a single paragraph. For example, income and
prices are changing, with important consequences for the budget
deficit. Vet the basic mechanism described here seems to come
shining through in all the models.
18. Or unless inflation itself is sufficiently damaging to
investment via, for example, the deterioration of the real
value of depreciation allowances. This last factor has been
stressed in a number of places by Feldstein. See, among
others, Feldstein (1980).
19. There is no distinction between money and high—powered
money under Friedman's plan, since part of his plan was the
elimination of fractional reserve banking.
20. This statement is predicated on defining high employment as
approximately the natural rate. With a Humphrey—Hawkins type
definition of high employment, the old Friedman rule can lead
to inflationary- disaster.
21. In reality, things are more complicated still because the
President and Congress often disagree over national economic
policy. A model with three stabilization authorities may be
better.PAGE 5
22. Theopposite policy mix ——tightbudgets and easy money ——
ihileconceivable, seems'to be rarely encountered.
23. For a lull discussion of the reasons forthese
disagreements. and why it is not obvious what to do about them.
see Blinder (1982).
24. In the simple example of Figure 2, "going it alone" also
leads to the Nash equilibrium. But this is not generally true.
A fuller discussion ofsomealternatives appears in Blinder
(1982).
25. McMillan and Beard (1982) study the same issue, reaching
conclusions opposite from those of Hamburger and Zwick (1981).
But Hamburger and Zwick (1982) argue that this is because
McMillan and Beard fail to align the data correctly in time.A
fifth study, far similar in spirit to my own, is that of Levy
(1981).I will comment on Levy's work as I present my own
results.
26. Hamburger and Zwick (1981, 1982) obtain stronger results
when they use a better measure of the deficit, a measure which
is similar to my own. They also stress the importance of
properly aligning the data in time.for Levy (1981). His dependent variable is si
The main dilference is that he uses (quarterl
n the adjusted base, whereas I use (annual) chan
bank reserves. Viewed from the perspective of
(17), Levy's choice imposes a coefficient of —1







divided by nominal GNP.
on of reserves even in
added to the regression.
heteroskedasticity, all
Also, to allow for some
the absence o-f deficits,
29. Barro (1978). Hamburger—Zwick (1
(1982) all found the lagged value of
important. Levy's (1981) study of c
found a significant lagged dependent
with quarterly data.
30. Levy (1981
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) estimated a (constant) marginal monetization
or the period 1952—1978, quite close to my
two equations cannot be compared in terms of
t because Levy did not make the correction for
city mentioned in footnote 2, used quarterly
much of his explanatory power from the lagged
able and seasonal dummies.I presume the fitsPAGE 7
are comparable, and so cannot agree with his conclusion that
"any implication that the largest portion of monetary policy is
random(should) be rejected" (p.!65).Page 1
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